Development of Measures for the Hierarchical Taxonomy of Psychopathology (HiTOP): A Collaborative Scale Development Project.

In this article, we describe the collaborative process that is underway to develop measures for the Hierarchical Taxonomy of Psychopathology (HiTOP). The HiTOP model has generated much interest in the psychiatric literature in recent years, but research applications and clinical translation of the model require measures that are specifically keyed to the model. To that end, the Measures Development Workgroup of HiTOP has been engaged in a collaborative effort to develop both questionnaire and interview methods that (a) are specifically tied to the elements of the HiTOP structure, and (b) provide one means of testing that structure. The work has been divided among five subgroups that are focused on specific HiTOP spectra. Our scale development methods are rooted in the principles of construct valid scale development. This report describes Phase 1 of this project, summarizes the methods and results thus far, and discusses the interplay between measurement and HiTOP model revisions. Finally, we discuss future phases of the scale development and the steps we are taking to improve clinical utility of the final measures.

The Delphic nature of the language of psychiatry.

In this perspective piece, the language used in psychiatric classification is considered from a linguistic and anthropological perspective. It is important for psychiatrists to consider how ambiguous language can impact on their view of clinical presentations and the delivery of treatments. Ultimately, delivering care using an empathic and humane approach should always be a primary consideration when treating mental illness.

Categorical differentiation of the unipolar and bipolar disorders.

There has been a longstanding debate as to whether the bipolar disorders differ categorically or dimensionally, with some dimensional or spectrum models including unipolar depressive disorders within a bipolar spectrum model. We analysed manic/hypomanic symptom data in samples of clinically diagnosed bipolar I, bipolar II and unipolar patients, employing latent class analyses to determine if separate classes could be identified. Mixture analyses were also undertaken to determine if a unimodal, bimodal or a trimodal pattern was present. For both a refined 15-item set and an extended 30-item set of manic/hypomanic symptoms, our latent class analyses favoured three-class solutions, while mixture analyses identified trimodal distributions of scores. Findings argue for a categorical distinction between unipolar and bipolar disorders, as well as between bipolar I and bipolar II disorders. Future research should aim to consolidate these results in larger samples, particularly given that the size of the unipolar group in this study was a salient limitation.

Melancholia defined with the precision of a machine.

BACKGROUND: The status of melancholia as a categorical or dimensional condition remains unclear, and no measure of melancholia has achieved definitive status. This study aimed to use a machine learning approach to assess whether a pre-established cut-off score on the Sydney Melancholia Prototype Index (SMPI) provided clear differentiation of melancholic/non-melancholic depression, and to identify the items making the most distinct contribution. METHODS: We analysed amalgamated data sets of 1513 clinically depressed patients assessed via the clinician-rated version of the SMPI (SMPI-CR). We also evaluated the self-report version of the SMPI (SMPI-SR) in a combined clinical/community sample of 2025 depressed patients and senior high school students. Rule ensembles were derived in which the outcome measure was the presence/absence of melancholia (defined as scoring at or above a SMPI cut-off score that had been established in previous studies) and the predictive variables were the individual SMPI items. RESULTS: The pre-established SMPI cut-off score was confirmed as differentiating melancholic/non-melancholic with near perfect accuracy for the SMPI-CR, and with very high accuracy for the SMPI-SR. The relative importance of all SMPI items was quantified. LIMITATIONS: It is difficult to validate SMPI-assigned diagnoses due to the lack of any similar measures. CONCLUSIONS: The SMPI-CR was confirmed to be a highly precise instrument for differentiating melancholic and non-melancholic depression. Its use will advance clinical decision making and studies evaluating causes, mechanisms and treatments for the two depressive sub-types, as well as assist clarification as to whether melancholia is categorically or dimensionally distinct from non-melancholic depression.

Concept Creep and Psychiatrization.

Some aspects of psychiatrization can be understood as forms of concept creep, the progressive expansion of concepts of harm. This article compares the two concepts and explores how concept creep sheds light on psychiatrization. We argue that although psychiatrization is in some respects a broader concept than concept creep, addressing institutional and societal dimensions of the expanding reach of psychiatry in addition to conceptual change, concept creep is broader in other respects, viewing the expansion of psychiatric concepts as examples of the broadening of a more extensive range of harm-related concepts. A concept creep perspective on psychiatrization clarifies the different forms of expansion it involves, the centrality of harm to it, its benefits as well as its costs, its variations across individuals and groups, and the drivers of psychiatrization in the general public and in fields beyond psychiatry.

Conceptual and historical evolution of psychiatric nosology.

Psychiatric taxonomies exist within conceptual frameworks which presuppose certain conceptions of psychiatric distress and offer guiding principles. This article provides an overview of the historical development of psychiatric classifications with an emphasis on their methodological assumptions. After identifying roots of scientific psychiatric classifications in the works of Sydenham and Linnaeus and discussing early classification systems, our survey focuses on the Kahlbaum-Hecker-Kraepelin paradigm (with its emphasis on longitudinal course of illness), the Wernicke-Kleist-Leonhard tradition (with its emphasis on neural systems), the development of the ICD and the DSM classifications (with their roots in medical statistics, their pragmatic nature, and their emphasis on descriptive and operationalized criteria), psychodynamic and idiographic perspectives (e.g. the Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual), and transdiagnostic approaches (e.g. Research Domain Criteria). The central philosophical questions of nosology (descriptive vs aetiological, symptoms vs course of illness, idiographic vs nomothetic, categorical vs dimensional, etc.) have appeared and reappeared throughout this evolution. Ongoing controversies reflect the epistemological and ontological difficulties inherent in defining and classifying mental illness. It may be that no single taxonomy can satisfy all clinical, research, and administrative needs, and that, echoing the ideas of Aubrey Lewis, multiple systems may be required to serve different needs.

A Functional Network Perspective on Posttraumatic Stress in Refugees: Implications for Theory, Classification, Assessment, and Intervention.

There is an important, long-standing debate regarding the universality vs. specificity of trauma-related mental health symptoms in socio-culturally and linguistically diverse population groups, such as refugees and asylum seekers. Network theory, an emerging development in the field of psychological science, provides a novel data analytic methodology to evaluate and empirically examine long-standing questions about the structure and function of posttraumatic stress symptoms. We sought to empirically model the functional network of posttraumatic stress symptoms among East African refugees who survived multiple potentially traumatic events. A sample of 148 Sudanese and Eritrean male asylum seekers (M(SD)age = 32.60(7.13) were recruited from the community in Israel. The nature and function(s) of posttraumatic symptoms (Harvard Trauma Questionnaire) were modeled using regularized partial correlation models to derive a network of symptoms. Spinglass and exploratory graph analysis walktrap algorithms were then used to identify functional "circuits of symptoms" or clusters of nodes within the network. Analyses revealed a functional symptom circuitry that shares features with the predominant western model of posttraumatic stress disorder; as well as unique functional clusters of symptoms inconsistent with nosology and symptomatology observed in studies of Western populations. Findings may have important implications for theory, classification, assessment, candidate mechanisms that may drive and maintain posttraumatic stress, and in turn may inform prevention or treatment for socio-culturally diverse forcibly displaced population groups.

Do we need to rethink our current classifications of mental disorders?
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The traditional categorical classification system and new diagnostic systems will be discussed in this issue.
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Heterogeneity and Subtyping in Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder-Considerations for Emerging Research Using Person-Centered Computational Approaches.

Few if any experts believe that existing psychiatric diagnostic categories included in DSM and ICD are actually discrete disease entities. Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is emblematic of the problems in the existing psychiatric classification system. ADHD symptoms reliably cluster into two correlated dimensions in factor analysis. However, children with ADHD vary considerably in their symptom profiles, symptom trajectories, clinical outcomes, and biological and psychological correlates. Thus, the field has sought alternative approaches that harness the dimensions of emotional, cognitive, and behavioral functioning that underlie ADHD and other existing psychiatric categories to create informative phenotypes that improve clinical prediction and clarify etiology. Within ADHD, cognitive (neuropsychological) and temperament/personality features have received considerable attention. In some cases, subphenotypes based on these features appear to improve on existing classifications and could eventually be translated into clinical practice. This review summarizes findings from subphenotyping efforts in ADHD that use cognitive, emotion-related, and other features to highlight major considerations for research applying person-oriented approaches to inform an improved psychiatric nosology. Considerations related to feature selection, validation of newly proposed divisions, defining populations of interest, and incorporating a developmental perspective are discussed.

How Well Does the DSM-5 Capture Schizoaffective Disorder?

Schizoaffective disorder has long been recognized and quite variably defined. It has been variably positioned as a discrete entity, a variant of either schizophrenia or of a mood disorder, as simply reflecting the co-occurrence of schizophrenia and a mood disorder, and effectively reflecting a diagnosis along a continuum linking schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. This article considers historical views, some empirical data that advance consideration of its status, and focuses on its classification in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition (DSM-5). DSM-5 criteria seemingly weight it in the direction of a schizophrenic illness, as do some empirical studies, whereas the empirical literature examining the response to lithium links it more closely to bipolar disorder. It is suggested that DSM-5's B and C criteria are operationally unfeasible. Some suggestions are provided for a simpler definition.

On illness, disease, and priority: a framework for more fruitful debates.

The distinction between 'disease' and 'illness' has played an important role in the debate between naturalism and normativism. Both employ these notions, yet disagree on whether to assign priority to 'disease' or 'illness'. I argue that this discussion suffers from implicit differences in the underlying interpretations: While for naturalists the distinction between 'disease' and 'illness' is one between a descriptive and a prescriptive notion, for normativists it is one between cause and effect. This discrepancy is connected to different interpretations of priority, which also tend to be conflated in the debate. I disambiguate these different usages and develop a distinction between 'disease' and 'illness' that is theoretically neutral with regard to naturalism or normativism. Moreover, I propose a concept of heuristic priority that could serve as a common focus. This framework can avoid common confusions by providing a shared terminology and thereby help to make debates on disease-concepts more fruitful.

The Impact of Translational Neuroscience on Revisiting Psychiatric Diagnosis: State of the Art and Conceptual Analysis.

This paper reviews translational research in psychiatry, focusing on those programs addressing the problem of the validity of psychiatric diagnoses. In medicine in general, and in psychiatry in particular, the term "translational" is used with different meanings. A conceptual analysis suggests that there are at least seven different types of translational research in psychiatry: T1 ("bench-to-bedside" development of tools and treatments), T2 (application of animal models to human psychiatry), T3 (papers focusing on the mind-brain gap, studying biological, neurobiological and cognitive dysfunctions), T4 (personalised therapies and prediction of treatment responses), T5 ("bedside-to-bench" translation of population data for laboratories), T6 (implementation of treatments at the population level, including accessibility and quality of services), and T7 (improving translational knowledge in residents' trainings and researchers' careers). Concerning the problem of validity of psychiatric diagnoses, new neurocognitive models like the Research Domain Criteria project are considered, in particular the translational program of cross-validation aimed at reducing the gap between neuroimaging data and psychopathological scores derived from rating-scales. It is shown that these programs are useful, filling some of the current research gaps, but it is also stressed that they carry implicit realist and reductionist assumptions. It is finally suggested that the formation of mental symptoms is a complex process involving both neurocognitive and semantic factors, which raises doubts about the possibility of complete translations, without residuals.

Misophonia: A new mental disorder?

Misophonia, a phenomenon first described in the audiology literature, is characterized by intense emotional reactions (e.g., anger, rage, anxiety, disgust) in response to highly specific sounds, particularly sounds of human origin such as oral or nasal noises made by other people (e.g., chewing, sniffing, slurping, lip smacking). Misophonia is not listed in any of the contemporary psychiatric classification systems. Some investigators have argued that misophonia should be regarded as a new mental disorder, falling within the spectrum of obsessive-compulsive related disorders. Other researchers have disputed this claim. The purpose of this article is to critically examine the proposition that misophonia should be classified as a new mental disorder. The clinical and research literature on misophonia was examined and considered in the context of the broader literature on what constitutes a mental disorder. There have been growing concerns that diagnostic systems such as DSM-5 tend to over-pathologize ordinary quirks and eccentricities. Accordingly, solid evidence is required for proposing a new psychiatric disorder. The available evidence suggests that (a) misophonia meets many of the general criteria for a mental disorder and has some evidence of clinical utility as a diagnostic construct, but (b) the nature and boundaries of the syndrome are unclear; for example, in some cases misophonia might be simply one feature of a broader pattern of sensory intolerance, and (c) considerably more research is required, particularly work concerning diagnostic validity, before misophonia, defined as either as a disorder or as a key feature of some broader syndrome of sensory intolerance, should be considered as a diagnostic construct in the psychiatric nomenclature. A research roadmap is proposed for the systematic evaluation as to whether misophonia should be considered for future editions of DSM or ICD.

Realismo e pragmatismo em psiquiatria: um debate / Realism and pragmatism in Psychiatry: a debate / Réalisme et pragmatisme em Psychiatrie: un débat / Realismo y pragmatismo en Psiquiatría: un debate / Realismus und Pragmatismus in der Psychiatrie: eine Debatte

O artigo apresenta um debate sobre a natureza do objeto da psiquiatria. Apresentam-se duas perspectivas de abordagem da questão — o realismo e o pragmatismo. Segundo o realismo, as condições denominadas transtornos mentais existiriam de forma autônoma, a despeito da conceitualização humana. Já as perspectivas pragmáticas pressuporiam que transtornos mentais não são suficientemente explicados como tipos naturais, porque normas e interesses humanos sempre estariam presentes em classificações psiquiátricas. São descritas as características, diferenças e pontos de limitação dessas abordagens.

This paper presents a debate on the nature of the object of Psychiatry. Two approaches to the issue are discussed: realism and pragmatism. According to realism, would exist autonomously the conditions known as mental disorders regardless of human conceptualization. Pragmatist perspectives assume that mental disorders are not sufficiently explained as natural types, since human norms and interests are always at stake in the making of psychiatric classifications. The specific features, differences, and limitations of both approaches are described.

Les auteurs présentent une réflexion critique à propos de la nature de l’objet de la psychiatrie. D’emblée, ils postulent deux voies [approches] majeures permettant d’explorer cette question fondamentale: le réalisme et le pragmatisme. Selon le réalisme, les troubles mentaux existent comme des entites autonomes, de facon independant d’une structuration conceptuelle. D’autre part, l’approche pragmatique met en avant les enjeux sociaux ce qui permet d’en déduire et d’affirmer que les troubles mentaux ne sont pas réductible à de types naturels. Enfin, les auteurs examinent brièvement et mettent en évidence les caractéristiques et limites de ces différentes approches dans la clinique psychiatrique.

El artículo presenta un debate sobre la naturaleza del objeto de la psiquiatría. Son discutidas dos perspectivas del problema: realismo y pragmatismo. Para el realismo, los trastornos mentales existen autónomamente, a pesar de la conceptua-lización humana. Las perspectivas pragmáticas suponen que los trastornos mentales no pueden ser explicados suficientemente como tipos naturales, pues las clasificaciones psiquiátricas son siempre atravesadas por normas e intereses humanos. Son descritas las características, diferencias y límites de ambos enfoques.

In diesem Artikel präsentieren wir eine Debatte über die Natur des Objektes in der Psychiatrie. Wir bieten somit zwei perspektiven bezüglich dieser Problematik- den Realismus einerseits, und den Pragmatismus als gegen Stellung. Für den Realismus würden die sogenannten Bedingungen der Psychiatrischen Störungen auf autonomer Weise vorhanden sein, und dies trotz menschlicher Konstruktionen. Pragmatische Perspektiven setzten voraus das Psychische Störungen nicht genügend durch ‘natural kinds’ erklärt werden können, weil menschliche Normen und sonstige Interessen sonst immer in Psychiatrischen Klassifikationen zu finden sind. Die Charakteristiken, Unterschiede und Einschränkungen werden dieser Perspektiven werden hier beschrieben.

Acute Suicidal Affective Disturbance (ASAD): A confirmatory factor analysis with 1442 psychiatric inpatients.

Acute Suicidal Affective Disturbance (ASAD) is a newly proposed diagnostic entity that characterizes rapid onset suicidal intent. This study aims to confirm the factor structure of ASAD among psychiatric inpatients, and to determine the clinical utility of ASAD in predicting suicide attempt status. Overall, 1442 psychiatric inpatients completed a battery of self-report questionnaires assessing symptoms theorized to comprise the ASAD construct. Utilizing these data, a confirmatory factor analysis with a one-factor solution was performed. Regression analyses were employed to determine if the ASAD construct predicted past suicide attempts, and analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were employed to determine if ASAD symptoms differed by the presence and number of past suicide attempts. The one-factor solution indicated good fit: χ(2)(77) = 309.1, p < 0.001, Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) = 0.96, comparative fit index (CFI) = 0.97, root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.05. Controlling for depressive disorders and current symptoms, the ASAD construct significantly predicted the presence of a past suicide attempt. Moreover, ASAD differentiated in the expected directions between individuals with a history of multiple suicide attempts, individuals with a single suicide attempt, and individuals with no history of a suicide attempt. Acute Suicidal Affective Disturbance (ASAD) appears to be a unified construct that predicts suicidal behavior and is distinct from an already-defined mood disorder.

What Is Constructionism in Psychiatry? From Social Causes to Psychiatric Classification.

It is common to note that social environment and cultural formation shape mental disorders. The details of this claim are, however, not well understood. The paper takes a look at the claim that culture has an impact on psychiatry from the perspective of metaphysics and the philosophy of science. Its aim is to offer, in a general fashion, partial explications of some significant versions of the thesis that culture and social environment shape mental disorders and to highlight some of the consequences social constructionism about psychiatry has for psychiatric explanation. In particular, it will be argued that the alleged dependence of facts about particular mental disorders and about the second order property of being a mental disorder on social facts amounts to a robust form of constructivism, whereas the view that clinician-patient interaction is influenced by cultural facts is perfectly compatible with an anti-constructivist stance.

The Troubled History of Psychiatry's Quest for Specificity.

Over the course of the nineteenth century, medical disciplines replaced holistic conceptions of body and mind with specific diagnoses that were unrelated to the qualities and circumstances of the individuals who harbored them. Despite periodic attempts from the late nineteenth through the mid-twentieth centuries to implement diagnostic systems based on the principle of specificity, psychiatric diagnoses remained undifferentiated, overlapping, and capacious. The need for medical legitimacy, compatibility with a biomedical model, and conditions that third parties would reimburse led psychiatry to replace the psychodynamically oriented DSM-I and DSM-II with the radically empiricist DSM-III in 1980. This manual emphasized explicit measurement, symptom-based entities, and homogeneous categories that were compatible with the specific disorders embraced in the rest of medicine. Yet the diagnostic system that the DSM-III launched was incongruent with the underlying nature of the continuous, fluid, and intersecting conditions with which psychiatry deals. The widespread institutionalization of the specific diagnostic system in psychiatric practice, however, prevented any thoroughgoing revisions when the DSM-5 was published in 2013. The result is an impasse between psychiatry's classificatory system and the need for scientific progress in understanding the causes of and treatments for mental disorders.

Psychiatric classification: Current debate and future directions.

Classification of health related conditions can be a complex task. This is particularly so in case of psychiatric disorders. The present paper reviews the fundamentals of psychiatric classification, including its basis, history, methods of evaluation, the journey so far and future directions. The various criticisms of current classificatory systems and possible solutions are discussed. Special reference to the research domain criteria (RDoC) approach has been made and implications discussed.